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A COMPARISON OF TWO PROPOSALS
FOR REGULATORY CHANGE
LUCILE SHEPPARD KEYES*

A

CCORDING TO the Presidential message transmitting to the
1L Congress the text of the proposed Aviation Act of 1975 (the
Act), this legislation is intended to "replace the present promotional and protectionist regulatory system with one which serves
the needs of the public by allowing the naturally competitive nature of the industry to operate."' It can fairly be said that this
same fundamental objective underlies the recommendations of the
CAB's Special Staff on Regulatory Reform (the Report).'
The two sets of proposals are also similar in contemplating the
prompt institution of measures designed to liberalize regulation
during an interim period, followed by further relaxation of controls after a period of several years. The next two sections of this
study will outline the major similarities and differences in the shortand long-term regulatory programs respectively. Only the principal
regulatory proposals are dealt with; no attempt is made at a comprehensive statement of either program.
In connection with the Report, the long term is to be understood as meaning "after a period of three to five years"; for the
Act, the long term means "beginning January 1, 1981." As will be
seen, three of the short-term proposals would go into effect only
after a certain delay: i.e., the Special Staff's plan for open entry
into all-cargo markets after two years, the Act's provision for
change in the treatment of airline mergers after thirty months, and
the Act's liberalization of control over route transfers on January
* Ph.D., Radcliffe. Economist, Washington, D.C. Member, Board of Advisors,
The Journal of Air Law and Commerce.

'Message from the President to the Congress of the United States transmitting
the proposed Aviation Act of 1975 (Oct. 8, 1975).
2 CAB, REGULATORY REFORM: REPORT OF SPECIAL STAFF ON REGULATORY REFORM

(1975)

(hereinafter cited as REPORT).
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1, 1978. In addition, the Act allows suspension of rate reductions
of twenty percent and forty percent below existing levels in the
first and second years, respectively, of the effectiveness of the legislation (if the Board believes that the proposed reduced rates will
be found to be illegal), after which suspension will be subject to
a more restrictive legislative rule. These provisions are dealt with
in more detail below.
A succeeding section will analyze the reasons for the differences,
and attempt to evaluate the economic consequences of each program and its capacity to achieve the basic purpose common to
both.
I. COMPARISON OF INTERIM PROGRAMS

In general, each interim program contemplates the liberalization
of charter rules, increased flexibility of pricing on the part of the
carriers, the lifting of operating restrictions contained in certificates of convenience and necessity, the broadening of authority to
operate noncertificated service with small aircraft, and the elimination of any uneconomic services which may at present be required by law. With regard to mergers, the differences of substance between the Act and the Staff's recommendation seem to be
more apparent than real, although there is a substantial difference
in the treatment of anticompetitive agreements. The only really
significant difference on entry policy, despite appearances to the
contrary, is the Report's proposal-not shared by the Act-that
open entry be provided for supplemental and all-cargo carriers.
The following presents a brief, but detailed treatment of each of
these areas of liberalization.
A. Charter policy
Though the Report and the Act both contemplate liberalization
of charter rules, only the Act provides that these rules be liberalized "permanently and by statute"' (emphasis supplied). For example, under the proposed legislation the Board could not require
purchase of "advance-purchase charter trip" tickets more than thirty days in advance or prevent the tour organizer from selling up to
twenty-five percent of the tickets at any time before departure,
3Section-by-Section Analysis accompanying the text of the Aviation Act of
1975 transmitted October 8, 1975, p. 1.
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and minimum stay requirements would be similarly limited by law.'
The Report, on the other hand, takes the view that expanded charter authority should be accomplished through rule-making, ' i.e.,

with the Board retaining the power to alter this authority and to
limit its applicability when necessary to protect "the corporate existence of individual scheduled carriers."'
B. Price policy
The basic difference between the Report and the Act regarding
price regulation in the short term is to be found in the latter's pro-

vision that "a rate above direct costs may not be found to be unjust or unreasonable on the basis that it is too low, and the Board
may ot require an air carrier to charge, demand, collect, or receive compensation in excess of that carrier's direct costs for the
service at issue.' The actual price flexibility provided under the
Act is in a range between a (somewhat modified) normal public
utility-type reasonable maximum and a "direct cost" floor. Its additional provisions for ten percent "flexibility" per year upward and
twenty percent "flexibility" per year downward in the first two
years of its effectiveness apply only to suspensions and not to actual regulatory ceilings or floors. The Report likewise retains a
(similarly modified) normal regulatory maximum8 for the interim
IS. 2551, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1975) (hereinafter cited as Aviation Act
of 1975).
'REPORT at 311-12. Under this proposal, the authority of the Board to effect
further liberalization would be clarified by a statutory change already proposed
by the Board.
6
1d. at 312.
7
Aviation Act of 1975 § 14(a). Section 14e adds the following definition of
direct costs: "'Direct costs' means the direct operating cost of providing service
to which a rate, fare, or charge applies, and shall not include such items as general
and administrative expenses; depreciation; interest payments; amortization; capital
expenses, costs associated with the development of a new route or service; and
other fixed costs or costs which do not vary immediately and directly as a result
of the service at issue."
' The Staff's recommendation is that the Board consider "through an appropriate proceeding, the [formal] adoption of a ceiling approach to rate-making"
REPORT, at 354, especially in view of the fact that "a commendable de facto
flexibility has been adopted [by the Board] with respect to discount fares." Id. at
351. The ceiling is to be calculated by "perfecting those standards set in the
DPFI," Id. at 360 (i.e., the recently concluded Domestic Passenger Fare Investigation, CAB Docket No. 21866), so as to "bring about closer conformity to the
price/quality mix desired by consumers, to discourage dissipation of profits by
wasteful practices, and to tailor the ceiling fare structure more closely to cost
relationships." REPORT at 361 (emphasis supplied). The new rule of rate-making

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

period, but the contemplated "floor" includes the possible use of
the minimum rate power to protect the finances of an existing carrier.9
C. Restrictions in certificates
Both the Act" and the Report contemplate the removal of operating restrictions contained in certificates of convenience and
necessity over a five-year period. Though the Staff's interim program calls merely for an "attempt to remove restrictions inhibiting carrier operations by developing a systematic program of
Board-instituted proceedings or hearing carrier applications meeting specified criteria,"" its basic reform program calls for the
abandonment of protective certification-and thus a fortiori the
elimination of certificate restrictions-after a period of three to five
years.
D. Elimination of uneconomic service
The Report and the Act agree on an abandonment policy which
would assure the carriers "that they would not be required to provide non-compensatory service."" Since this policy involves no essential departure from the Board's present practice, it does not
receive great emphasis in the Report; however, it is recommended
that the Board accord priority "to proceedings that would eliminate uneconomic service. ' '
E. Mergers and agreements
Neither the Report nor the Act contemplates any major substantive change in merger regulation as compared with the Board's
past and current practice. As the Report notes, "The Board has
generally discouraged mergers that would significantly further concentrate the industry by refusing to approve mergers between large
in the Act points to a similar modification of accepted public utility rate-making
principles in requiring the Board to consider as being in the public interest "the
quality and type of service required by the public in each market" and "the desirability of a variety of price and service options such as peak and off-peak pricing to improve economic efficiency." Aviation Act of 1975, § 14(b).
9 REPORT at 360.
1Aviation Act of 1975 §§ 6(c) and 9.
"REPORT at 378.

1 Id. at 9.
'3 Id. at 377.
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carriers, and between viable carriers,""' and there is good reason to
believe that most, if not all, of the Board-approved mergers would
have passed the legal test prescribed in the Act." The Staff's only
recommendation for change in the interim period was that the
Board "seriously consider the disapproval of merger applications

within the industry if a failing carrier can be reasonably expected
to be purchased or otherwise rescued by outside interests."'" The
expanded role which the Act would prescribe for the Department
of Justice, because based on the same substantive rule that would

govern the actions of the Board, would presumably not make any
appreciable difference in the operative meaning of the law.

With respect to intercarrier agreements, a substantial difference
is the Act's categorical prohibition of the approval of agreements
controlling capacity, providing for pooling, or fixing prices.' The
Special Staff expressly endorsed the "short-term approval of capaci-

ty agreements [that] can forestall a merger or bankruptcy of a major carrier"'" during the interim period, and did not expressly recommend disapproval of other forms of anticompetitive agreement
for such a purpose during this period.
F. Entry

Both the Staff Report and the Act provide for promptly expanding commuter carrier exempt authority to accommodate aircraft
of approximately fifty-five revenue seats (up from the present thirty."' The Report, however, proposes a further opening up of zones
14 Id. at 388.

"5Section 11 of the Aviation Act of 1975 provides that, after a 30-month
period, the Board is not to approve any consolidation, merger, or acquisition of
control "(1) if it would result in a monopoly or would be in furtherance of any
combination or conspiracy to monopolize the business of air transportation in
any part of the United States, or (2) whose effect in any section of the country
may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly, or
which in any other manner would be in restraint of trade, unless the Board finds
that the anticompetitive effects of the proposed transaction are outweighed in the
public interest by the probable effect of the transaction in meeting the transportation convenience and needs of the community or communities to be served, and
unless it finds that such transportation convenience and needs may not be satisfied
by any less anticompetitive alternative." On the Board's past policy, see Keyes,
Notes on the History of Federal Regulation of Airline Mergers, 37 J. AIR L. &
COM. 357 (1971).
11REPORT at 389.
17Aviation

1

REPORT

"Aviation

Act of 1975 § 12.

at 393.
Act of 1975 § 6(b);

REPORT

at 333-36. The Report recommends
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of air transport service not to be subject to protective regulationthat is, supplemental air transportation and all-cargo air carriage. 0
Assuming that section 6(b) of the Act is amended to reflect more
closely the intent of its authors, the open zones proposal constitues the only really significant substantive difference between the
Report and the Act as regards entry control in the short term. The
Act does indeed contain a provision for procedural reform in the
treatment of route applications"' which has no parallel in the Report. The set of general principles for the treatment of such applications which is recommended in the Report," however, if publicly
adopted after notice and hearing, could form an appropriate basis
for a reformed procedure such as is envisaged in the Act.
Although the Act at first reading appears to embody further significant relaxation of controls over entry in the immediate future,
a closer look at the legislation reveals that it would not accomplish this result. The features of the Act which seem to offer hospitality to new competition are threefold: (1) Section 6 (b), which
provides that any one who is "fit, willing, and able" will be permitted to provide air transportation "between any two cities not
receiving nonstop air transportation by an air carrier holding a certificate of convenience and necessity"; (2) section 7, which provides that beginning on January 1, 1978, transfers of authority to
engage in interstate scheduled air transportation to any air carrier will be similarly subject only to a "fitness, willingness, and
ability" test (plus procompetitive standards of section 408 of
the Federal Aviation Act); and (3) section 4, which embodies a
new declaration of policy.
In connection with section 6(b), it should be pointed out that
a recent study by the CAB's Bureau of Operating Rights shows
that by 1973, eighty-eight percent of the 210 forty-eight state city
pairs involving all combinations of the nation's twenty-one large
hubs were already receiving nonstop service, and only one such
that larger aircraft be authorized only in city-pair markets not served by a local
service carrier with the same class of aircraft.
"1
REPORT at 311-33. As is brought out below, the Staff's recommendations with
respect to all-cargo carriage would consist of two steps, a more limited liberalization to be undertaken immediately, and completely open entry after two years.
21 Aviation

22 REPoRT

Act of 1975 § 5.
at 374-86.
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city pair did not have single-plane service." In this study, a citypair market is defined to include service to satellite airports as
well as principal terminals. Presumably the drafters of the Act
had a similar definition in mind, since very important trunkline
markets would otherwise have been opened up at once to new
competition under the proposed law.
The Act should-and presumably will-be changed to clarify
this point and to prevent other circumventions of its intent by such
means as combinations of nonstop services to provide single-plane,
through, or connecting service between large hubs. For this purpose, a case-by-case assessment of possible competitive impact on
existing services would apparently be required; any prospective
service appearing to involve the possibility of significant competitive impact would then be subjected to the ordinary certification
process.
The Bureau further estimated that among city pairs not receiving nonstop service in 1972, there were 372 "in which traffic might
be expected to grow sufficiently to warrant nonstop service by
1985."' In 247 of these, or sixty-six percent of the total, the
Bureau found that unrestricted nonstop authority already existed
at the time of the study.' In these markets the incumbent carrier
could preempt new competition by instituting nonstop service without the necessity for any further administrative action at all. Of
the remaining thirty-four percent, single plane service was found
to be authorized in all but two cases. With these two exceptions,
therefore, authorization of nonstop service by the incumbents required only the removal of certificate restrictions. Under the proposed legislation, these restrictions would be eliminated by 1981 in
any case, so that here again the incumbents would be able to preempt competition without administrative action. Meanwhile, it
is unreasonable to suppose that the Board would often refuse to
eliminate an existing restriction on an incumbent in a market
"threatened" by new nonstop competition. Some of this preemptive
nonstop service might well be premature and therefore temporarily unprofitable.
23

CAB, THE

TIONS,

DOMESTIC ROUTE SYSTEM: ANALYSIS AND POLICY RECOMMENDA-

at 21-25 (1975).

PId. at 139.
Id. at 142.
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Section 7 of the Act would appear to be similarly unpromising
as an avenue to new competition. In the first place, a carrier would
be unlikely to sell off (unless at an exorbitant price) an important
market except under extreme financial duress. In addition, if such a
sale were made, it would necessarily involve a commitment by the
seller not to serve the market in question-a commitment which
would constitute a restriction (by contract) similar to those which
the legislation seeks to eliminate in the carrier's certificates, and
would obviously make it impossible for the transfer mechanism to
result in any net new competition on any route. Moreover, if such
a sale were made, the effect would be capitalization of a monopoly right, the financing of which the purchaser would have to add
to his costs of operation. It may also be noted that the opportunity to purchase a route is expressly limited to those who already enjoy the status of "air carrier," which means those who either already enjoy the status of "air carrier," which means those who
either already possess Federal certification (the certificated
route air carriers and supplementals) or have been exempted by
the Board from the certification requirement (indirect air carriers,
air commuters, and air taxis).
As 1981 approaches, the attractiveness of the section 6(b) avenue to non-air carriers as well as certificated and exempt carriers,
and the attractiveness of the section 7 avenue to the latter two, as
a means of getting a foot into the door of scheduled service, will
increase somewhat as a result of the automatic expansion provisions which become operative in 1981 under the Act. As will be
noted in the following section of this discussion, however, the
quantative impact of this possibility will apparently be minor.
The provision of the Act which at first appears to offer the
greatest opportunity for opening up entry within and into the industry is the amended declaration of policy," a straightforward interpretation of which would require immediate abandonment of
the protection of carrier profits as an objective for regulatory action. This requirement would, of course, put a prompt end to the
practice of protective entry control. A brief discussion of the significant changes embodied in the amended policy declaration will
serve to bring out this point.
26

Aviation Act of 1975, § 4.
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There are three changes in the policy declaration which have
an important bearing on the administration of entry control. First,
the removal of the mandate to regulate air transportation as to
"foster sound economic conditions . . . in such transportation."'
Secondly, the removal of "promotion" of air carrier services and of
civil areonautics in general as one of the aims of regulation."
Thirdly, the replacement of the statutory endorsement of "competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound development of
an air-transportation system properly adapted to the needs of the
foreign and domestic commerce of the United States, of the Postal
Service, and of the national defense"2 (emphasis added) by two
new provisions directing the Board to consider "maximum reliance
on competitive market forces and on actual and potential competition to provide the needed air transportation system" and "the
encouragement of new air carriers" as being "in the public interest
and in accordance with the public convenience and necessity.
The new references to responsiveness to the needs of the public and
"the provision of a variety of adequate, economic, efficient and
low-cost services" (emphasis supplied) might also be construed as
favoring new entrants proposing to provide innovative forms of
service, especially at bargain prices.
Both "sound economic conditions" and "promotion" as regulatory aims can be and have been interpreted as implying protection of the finances of particular airline companies by deliberate
restriction of new competition. The elimination of these terms, especially in light of the Presidential Message cited above, might
therefore plausibly be interpreted as implying that such protection
is no longer to be provided. Moreover, such protection is certainly
incompatible with "maximum reliance on competitive market
forces and on actual and potential competition," and has historically played a major (but largely indirect) role in discouraging entry of new carriers into the trunkline industry.
Adoption of this interpretation would radically alter the operative meaning of the "public convenience and necessity" and elimi27 Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 102(b), 72 Stat. 731, as amended, 49 U.S.C.
1302(b), formerly, Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973.
28 Federal Aviation Act of 1958 §§ 102(c), (f), 49 U.S.C. §§ 1302(c), (f)
(1970).
29Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 102(d), 49 U.S.C. § 1302(d) (1970).
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nate the whole process of carrier selection as it is now understood.
Whether a market could be expected to support an additional carrier would be irrelevant to public policy if it were not necessary to
protect the profitability of the applicant or of the current incumbent, and there would be no need to reject any qualified (fit, willing, and able) applicant. "Choice of carrier," in the sense of selection among qualified applicants on the basis of (probable) relative performance, would be left to the market.
The very broadness of the new policy declaration makes it virtually certain, however, that a straightforward interpretation of it
will not be accepted by the Board or by the courts, if only for the
reason that immediate adoption of such an interpretation (and the
law provides for no delay in its effectiveness) would be manifestly
inconsistent with the program of limited liberalization which is
clearly contemplated in the rest of the Act. For example, there
would be no reason to single out markets not now receiving nonstop service as subject to open entry by the fit, willing, and able if
the same condition were intended to prevail with respect to all
markets.
It may be concluded that passage of the Act, assuming that it
is changed to reflect the intent of its authors, would result in no
significant changes in entry conditions in the interim period, apart
from the expansion of commuter carrier authority. The same
observation applies to the recommendations of the Special Staff,
with the additional exceptions of the opening up of supplemental
and air cargo transportation."
II. COMPARISON OF LONG-TERM PROGRAMS

In contrast to the situation in the short term, very pronounced
and basic differences exist between the Act's long-term program
and that out-lined in the Staff Report. These differences pertain es3o Certain additional recommendations of the Staff with respect to entry policy
would appear to be of little practical importance. At least in the absence of extraordinary political pressure, it seems very unlikely that granting priority to applications such as that of World Airways to provide low-fare service in the transcontinent market (Docket 27693) would bring about a reversal of the Board's
long-term and consistent practice of denying new entry in trunkline markets. REPORT at 383-86. Moreover, the introduction of Board-estimated "comparative
economic efficiency" of carriers into the existing list of selection factors, REPORT
at 388, would probably have a minor effect on the ultimate outcome of new route
proceedings.
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pecially to entry control, charter policy, public utility-type maximum price regulation, and, to a lesser extent, merger regulation.
Despite some differences in administration, it would appear that
the substantive treatment of minimum prices, exit, and intercarrier
agreements would not differ very greatly under the two proposed
regimes.
A. Entry Control and Charter Policy
The Special Staff recommended the abandonment of protective
entry control throughout the airline business in the long term, "together with the adoption of a procedure to insure continuing financial fitness, and observance of insurance and bonding require-

ments, on the part of air carriers, whether existing or newly entering the field."' Such a regime would imply the absence of restric-

tive charter rules, although regulation of the use of the term to
avoid deception of the public might conceivably prove to be necessary." The Act, on the other hand, would permit retention of restrictive charter rules subject to the limits it prescribes, and provide

for continuation of the same controls (substantially unchanged)
over entry as existed in the short-term period, plus the permission
of an essentially arbitrary yearly route expansion for existing sched-

uled carriers with very limited opportunity for new competition
from outside the scheduled industry.'
31 The "financial fitness" and insurance and bonding requirements are intended
to supplement safety regulation by the Federal Aviation Administration, which
regulation appears to require strengthening at the present time, whether or not
economic regulation is reformed. Although the "financial fitness" requirement has
been in force for some years with respect to the supplemental carriers, it has
never, so far as the present writer has been able to determine, resulted in the
grounding of any supplemental airline, despite the fact that a number of these
have experienced large and continuing losses and passed from the scene. The requirement appears to be useful only in screening out the (admittedly unlikely)
entrant or the (even more unlikely) existing operator who could meet FAA
technical requirements but possessed insufficient working capital to cover maintenance expenses.
2The Special Staff was unable, during the time allowed, to develop detailed
recommendations for the regulatory apparatus which would be appropriate in the
long term. It therefore recommended further study of several aspects of this apparatus, including "[e]xamination of the tariff provisions of Title IV [of the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958] to determine whether they are adequate to assure continued publication of, availability of, and adherence to tariffs and schedules, to
provide the necessary information to establish a market, to facilitate interline
ticketing . . .

,

and to provide ample notice for the alteration, commencement,

or termination of schedules." REPORT at 304.
" Aviation Act of 1975 § 9.
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Beginning in 1981, large (trunkline size) and medium-sized unsubsidized passenger carriers would be permitted to expand their
route systems every year without administrative control, to the
tune of five percent of the average ASM's operated by this type of
carrier in the preceding year. Smaller carriers would be permitted
to expand by ten percent of the average ASM's of the carriers in
their class, or ten percent of their own ASM's, whichever was
larger. There would be two such smaller-carrier classes, one comprising carriers of the size of the subsidized local service airlines
and the other made up of smaller operators. All-cargo carriers
would be permitted to expand yearly by ten percent of the average
available ton-miles in this class. Both intrastate and interstate
carriers would be eligible for "free" expansion, but those not engaged in scheduled service would not be so eligible, and only
scheduled mileage would be counted in computing the basis for
expansion. Moreover, the Board would be required to issue a
permanent certificate for any new route served under this provision when it had been operated for a period of twelve consecutive months with a minimum of five round trips per week. Thus,
after a year, there would be no effective limit on the amount of capacity which can be provided on the freely "occupied" new
routes.
It is not easy to predict the effect of this odd (to say the least)
form of controlled entry. It appears, however, to have no plausible
justification in terms of basic reform, continued protection, or transitional gradualism. Since the allocation of new route opportunities
among carriers is essentially arbitrary, and the opportunities are
in any event limited to those who already have a foothold in the
scheduled industry, the procedure certainly cannot be called basic
reform. On the other hand, the expansion opportunities (especially
in view of the unlimited amount of capacity which can be offered
after a year) are entirely sufficient to permit weaker existing carriers to be progressively eliminated. The scheme evidently does
not represent a gradual transition to a basically reformed system,
with free entry and free pricing, since such a system would never
be arrived at. On the contrary, it appears to involve the effective
continuation of the present closed system with ultimately an even
greater tendency to concentration and non-aggressiveness.
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The attractiveness of the sections 6(b) and 7 avenues to entry
will be somewhat increased by the availability to entrants of "free"
or "automatic" expansion under Section 9 beginning in 1981. Although there is no reason to believe that these avenues would offer
any broader opportunity for profitable new services in the long
term than in the short, some uneconomic services might conceivably be initiated under these sections as stepping stones to greener
pastures; similarly, some new firms might be tempted to try to initiate intrastate operations with large aircraft,3 ' or air commuter
operations, with a view to becoming eligible for expansion. Because all of these avenues would permit initial operations only at
a very small scale, however, and the opportunity for "free" growth
would hence be limited to that available to the smallest class of
carrier, the potential expansion of any new entrant would be effectively limited.
B. Maximum and Minimum Price Regulation
In keeping with its recommendation of open entry, the Special
Staff also recommended the abandonment of public utility-type
price regulation, including both ceilings and floors. The Act, on
the other hand, would permit the continuation of traditional (but,
as has been noted, somewhat modified) maximum price regulation
and would provide for a direct-cost floor administered by the
Board. Since the antitrust laws can presumably be relied on to
prevent price cuts for the purpose of knocking out a competitor,
which result in short-term losses, there should be little effective difference in minimum price regulation under the two long-term regimes.
C. Merger Policy
As was indicated above, the Act provides for continuing control over mergers by the CAB, which could grant antitrust immunity on the basis of a finding that a transaction's anticompetitive
34 Opportunities for entry into intrastate operations with large aircraft will
be limited by protective regulation by State governments, unless some action is
taken to prevent this. In this connection, the Special Staff recommended that a

qualified body "consider the question of whether action will be needed to forestall
restrictive State regulation by establishing Federal jurisdiction to the boundaries
of the present air commerce definition under the Federal Aviation Act, thus preempting State regulation, or at least to the jurisdictional limits of present Federal

economic regulation, so as to avoid litigation based on Constitutional grounds of
burdening interstate commerce." REPORT at 306.
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effects are outweighed by its contribution to transportation convenience and needs, which contribution could not be secured by a
less anticompetitive method. This standard is generally regarded as
more permissive than that utilized under the antitrust laws; to the
extent that this is really the case, the Special Staff Report provides
a more stringent control over airline mergers than does the Act.
The Report recommends the application of straight antitrust standards, with any special administrative agency which may remain
or be set up over the airline industry limited to receiving premerger notification and informing and advising the Attorney General on such cases.'
D. Exit
The long, as well as the short-term recommendations, of both
the drafters of the Act and the Special Staff are in general agreement that no carrier shall be compelled to continue to provide any
uneconomic service; and each contemplates that service shall be
terminated only after due notice.
E. IntercarrierAgreements
While the long-term treatment of intercarrier agreements, like
some other aspects of reformed regulation, was believed by the
Staff to warrant further study,' it foresaw no justification, under
the reformed regime, for anticompetitive agreements designed
merely to protect individual carrier finances. This position appears
to be basically similar to that embodied in the Act.
F. Recommendations Regarding Subsidization of Service to Small
Communities
In addition to the major long- and short-term regulatory recommendations just discussed, the Special Staff proposed a plan for replacement of the present program of subsidization of the local-serREPORT

at 305-06.

'REPORT at 303-04. The Staff recommended that a qualified body undertake
to consider "the question whether antitrust immunity actually is necessary to

permit carriers to achieve otherwise unavailable cost reductions and product im-

provements, including action to meet special semi-emergency situations, and, if

such immunity is necessary, [the formulation of] an exact rule to make sure that
the agency empowered to grant immunity does not do so for other purposes." The

Staff also recommended that this body develop "a statutory rule directing the
agency supervising intercarrier relations to make sure that any cooperative agreements or arrangements facilitating the efficient operation of the air transport system are administered in a nonexclusionary and nondiscriminatory fashion."
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vice airlines under the Federal Aviation Act with a less costly lowbid contract system better designed to secure needed service at

isolated small communities," a program which had previously been
submitted to Congress on the basis of a definitive study of the
problem by the Board's staff.3 The Report also proposed certain
less comprehensive reforms which should be undertaken in this
area if the contract system were not adopted." On this subject, the
Act merely recommended that the Secretary of Transportation undertake a year-long study of the subsidization program, including
identification of "the cost of local service subsidy involved in providing service at each city,"' and recommend any necessary
changes to Congress. Further discussion of these proposals would
take us too far away from the central topic of this study, which
has to do with regulation rather than subsidization.
III.

ANALYSIS OF DIFFERENCES AND EVALUATION
OF. CONSEQUENCES

To recapitulate: On the assumption that section 6(b) is amended as suggested above, the chief differences between the short-term
regulatory programs of the Report and the Act are (I) the Report's
more conservative approach to charter rules, pricing and intercarrier agreements; and (2) the Staff's recommendation that open
entry be promptly provided in supplemental and all-cargo air
transportation. For the long term, the Staff suggests a far more liberal approach to entry, charters, and maximum price control, and
(probably) a somewhat less permissive approach to the treatment of mergers. Other differences are of relatively minor import.
The chief reason for the Staff's relative conservatism in certain
areas in the short run was its belief that expectations built up
over a period of thirty-seven years should not be abruptly disappointed, a consideration which was thought to necessitate the continuation of the established policy of protective regulation for a
generous time period, estimated by the Staff at three to five years.
It was believed that such a period would also provide ample time
31REPORT at 336-39.
Is CAB, STAFF STUDY
MUNITIES RIGHTS

"REPORT

at

OF THE BUREAU OF OPERATING, SERVICE TO SMALL COM-
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for studying some as yet unresolved questions regarding the precise substantive and administrative make-up of a reformed regulatory scheme. A second reason for conservatism was the belief
that, given the maintenance of the policy of protective entry control, any major uncontrolled or irreversible relaxation of other controls over competition within the closed group of certificated scheduled carriers could lead to further artificial concentration of the
industry in the transitional period, which might in turn tend to inhibit competition in the long run.
It would then become necessary to provide an adequate period
of time for preparation of a more open regulatory framework.
Such preparation, possibly including reshaping of route systems,
revision of capital structures, pruning of unnecessary expenses,
formation of subsidiaries to take over homogeneous subsets of a
carrier's present system (and thus possibly reaping the economic
advantages of specialization), was considered to be far more acceptable than direct indemnification of the affected interests. As
the Report stated:
Abrupt change could be objected to as tending unjustly to upset expectations built up over a long period of years. This consideration does not, of course, justfy indefinite continuation of the
status quo; otherwise, an industry subjected to protective regulation would be forever foreclosed from the institution of a more
competitive regulatory framework. It cannot be accepted that protective regulation, or other governmentally-conferred privilege,
should be preserved intact forever because of the expectations of
special sectors of the economy, in disregard of the basic rights and
interest of the nation as a whole.
Other than a suitable amount of time to prepare for the new
dispensation, it does not appear that considerations of equity or
practicality require that any special aid or indemnity be provided for the affected interests. Suggestions for compensation for
the value of the route certificates, offers for government purchase
of aircraft, or special subsidies to "cushion" possible losses all
amount either to the recognition of a non-existent property right
in the certificates or to a means of buying off potential opposition. "'
Within a closed group, uncontrolled price competition may well
lead to undesirable results: the prevailing pattern of nonaggressive
41 REPORT
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equilibrium among interdependents may be broken from time to
time by a campaign of predation, since a notably weak airline
would present a tempting target for such a campaign in a situation in which a defeated firm could be expected not to be replaced
from outside. Given the apparent differences in the efficiency of
various carriers, a direct-cost price floor might prove insufficient to
prevent such a development.
In accordance with the same desire to avoid the abrupt disappointment of expectations, the Staff's proposals for opening up
entry into all-cargo and supplemental air transportation (as well
as its recommendation that the size limitation on exempt commuter
aircraft be raised) were believed to involve no loss of presently
valuable rights to those directly affected and no severe financial
impact on any other air carriers outside the group."2 The benefits
anticipated as a result of opening up entry for supplementals included the maintenance of "the already high efficiency level attained by these firms" and consequent insurance "that the lowprice, low-quality option they offer will continue to be provided
at minimum cost." It was also believed that charter services
would be extended under this dispensation to "markets that would
not otherwise be served" and that the Board, the Congress and
others would be provided "with continuous objective evidence on
labor and other costs associated with large aircraft operations not
conducted under a monopoly license.'"' Open entry into the allcargo field (together with the also recommended elimination of
cargo rate regulation) was expected to "(1) maintain or enhance
the current quality of service, and possibly lead to lower rates than
otherwise would be charged; [and] (2) offer the potential for longrun improvements in carrier efficiency, rates and service, as well
as the penetration of markets that are now served primarily by
surface transport.""
The liberality of the regulatory framework recommended by
the Special Staff for the long term is justified by an analysis of the
41 Id. at 321-22, 324, 325. With respect to the all-cargo market, entry was to
become entirely open after a two-year period. Meanwhile, entry was to be opened
for carriage of high-density cargo and in markets receiving only a small amount
of all-cargo service during a specified base period. Id. at 323.
3
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basic economic characteristics of the airline industry and by examination of the historic performance of that industry under regulation. For these underlying arguments, the reader must be referred
to the text of the Report of the Special Staff. The recommended
treatment of mergers in accordance with general antitrust principles rests on the belief that the airline industry does not require
some specially higher degree of monopoly in order to function efficiently. Elimination of maximum price control similarly seems appropriate because of the expected efficacy of actual and potential
competition in limiting airline pricing. The abandonment of protective entry control is essential in order that actual and potential
competition be fully effective in limiting price, promoting quality
and efficiency, and spurring innovation.
For the industry to achieve maximum service of public needs
through competition, it seems to be of crucial importance that airline markets be opened up to competition from outside the presently certificated industry. If the industry remains effectively closed
to outsiders, the interdependent in-group will be likely as a rule to
continue the typical nonaggressive pattern which has characterized
its behavior in the past. It is a fact of the highest significance that
both of the major marketing innovations in the history of the industry-air coach and charters-received their impetus from outside the protected group.' Without open access from the outside,
then, the industry under the proposed Act might well continue in
essentially the same pattern as it has done in the past, with the
steady attrition in numbers aggravated by uncontrolled, arbitrarily
distributed competition from within and by a policy towards mergers which appears to be at least as permissive as that followed by
the Board in the past. In the supplemental field, maintenance of
closed entry as the charter market expands would be likely to result
in a decrease in efficiency, accompanied by an increase in the value
(now at or near zero) of the existing license; consequently, far
greater difficulty would be experienced in opening up the market
4 See, for example, Jones & Davis, The 'Air Coach' Experiment and National
Air Transport Policy, 17 J. AIR L. & CoM. 1, 3 (1950), and the testimony of

Secor D. Browne (then Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board) in the Hearings
before the Subcommittee on Aviation of the U.S. Senate Commerce Committee,
amending the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Serial No. 92-105 (1973).
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at a future date.' A similar development might well occur in the
all-cargo industry.
At the same time, the continuation of maximum price control
by the Board, in a period when inflationary cost increases are not
expected to be offset (as in most of the past) by the results of
technological advance, 7 will bring about a strong possibility that
carrier earnings will be held artificially low because of political
pressures, that the debt-equity ratios of the carriers will deteriorate
further, and that the decline in industry numbers will be further
accelerated. ' It would seem that contemplation of these possible
consequences should persuade the sponsors of the Aviation Act of
1975 to consider reformulation of its major provisions.'

4 '

On this point, see the REPORT at 3 19-21.

" See note 23 supra at 122-29.
REPORT at 257-66.
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Such a reconsideration appears to be especially appropriate in view of the
fact that the Secretary of Transportation in a recent major policy statement has
48

joined the Board and practioally all serious students of transportation economics

in repudiating the policy and practice of cross-subsidization, thus undermining the
principal argument now in use by proponents of protective regulation. SECRETARY
OF TRANSPORTATION, STATEMENT OF NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION POLICY at 12,
14 (1975).

